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Abstract. A structure called a decision making problem is considered. The set
of outcomes (consequences) is partially ordered according to the decision maker’s
preferences. The problem is how these preferences affect a decision maker to prefer
one of his strategies (or acts) to another, i.e. it is to describe so called derived
preference relations. This problem is formalized by using category theory approach
and reduced to a pure algebraical question. An effective method is suggested to build
all reasonable derived preferences relations and to compare them with each other.
Key words: Decision making problem, games with ordered outcomes, preference
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0. Introduction
It is known that at first a decision making problem (DMP) was built as a struc-
ture with a real-valued payoff function. Later on DMP appeared with a vector-
valued payoff function. We consider a decision making problem with goal structure
given by a partial ordering relation (preferences of a decision maker) on the set
of outcomes. At the present moment such decision making problems have become
of great interest. By the time the article had been written and tested, the inter-
esting paper of Dubois, Fargier, Perny and Prade (2002) appeared devoted to the
same subject and contained an extensive bibliography. It gives us an opportunity
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to refer a reader to this paper for the history of the problem. We only mention
such papers that concern our results immediately. In spite of the common subjects
the approaches of the present paper and the one cited above are different and re-
sults have no intersections. Below, we describe more exactly relations between the
present paper and Dubua et al.(2002) that we name for short QDT.
The main problem considered in the present paper is the ”transference” of pref-
erences from the set of outcomes (consequences) to the set of decision maker’s
strategies (or acts), i.e. ranking the strategies knowing that some of consequences
are better than others. Such ranking is called a derived preference relation. The
point is that such transference of notions and principles used for classical DMPs to
DMPs with preferences is based usually on intuition and leads frequently to anom-
alies. Further, in the next section, we explain what we mean. The similar problem
is the subject of QDT, but there are some important differences.
The set of outcomes (consequences) is assumed in our paper to be partially
ordered, while in QDT it is completely preordered (weakly ordered). A derived
preference relation is regarded as a preorder, while in QDT it is assumed to be a
partial order. But it is not essential because our approach works in all cases. It
is essential that the authors of QDT formulate that ”the real decision problem is
to build this relation (ranking of acts) from information regarding the likelihood of
states and the decision maker preference on consequences”, while we take in account
only last one. They do not explain what ”to build” means but use some axioms
motivated somehow or other. On the other hand, we concentrate our attention
on giving a suitable mathematical formalization of the mentioned problem and on
building all derived preference relations applying obtained mathematical results.
Thus we think that the present paper is not a rival but an addition to QDT.
DMP considered in the paper is a structure, which components are a nonempty
set X of alternatives (strategies) of a decision maker, a nonempty set of states A,
a partially ordered set (A, ω) of outcomes and a map F that assigns an outcome
F (x, y) to every strategy x if the state of the world is y. It is to mention that the
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map F determines a map F ∗ from X to the set AY . The set AY is called the set of
acts of the decision maker. Usually, the set of acts is considered instead of the set of
strategies. But we do not suppose that every act can be realized by the considered
decision maker.
A decision maker has to prefer one of his strategy to another according to his
preferences in the set of outcomes which are given by the partial order ω, that
is he has to ”build” a relation ρ on the set of his strategies. We think that this
relation has to be a preorder relation and has to be consistent with the preference
relation ω and with the realization function F . We shall call every such relation ρ a
derivative preference relation. We look for a general principle to build the derivative
preference relations for all DMPs like for example the maxmin principle that is
the main optimality principle in the classical decision making theory. But absence
of any one-valued (functional) connection between alternatives and outcomes makes
the problem non-trivial.
Observe that a decision making problem can be considered as a game such that
a player knows only his own preferences but does not know the preferences of other
players. Namely this approach is used in the monograph Moulin (1981).
A new approach in the present paper is the use of category theory as a ”method-
ological base” for formalizing the problem. This approach leads to a method of
constructing of derived preference relations based on algebraic theory of monoids
of binary relations. The main steps of solving the set up problem are the following
ones. At first (section 2), the conditions (axioms) are formulated for a derivative
preference relation. We proceed from minimal assumptions mentioned above and
the assumption that so called Pareto-domination is a part of every derived prefer-
ence relation. From the point of view of category theory, these conditions mean
the existence of special functor (preference functor) from the category of DMPs to
the category of preordered sets. In QDT, the so called Ordinal Invariance Axiom
is assumed. May be it is at the bottom of some pessimistic conclusion in the men-
tioned paper. Instead of this axiom, we assume much weaker one that is fulfilled
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for all suggested in literature preference relations.
Further (section 3), we show that constructing of the preference functor can be
reduced to the constructing of some special functor from the category of ordered sets
to the category of preordered sets. The main results are formulated in Theorem 1
and Theorem 2, that give an effective method to construct the required functors.
Our method leads to anomalies-free preference relations, and it turns out that
practically all known ways to specification of derivative preference relations are
some concrete cases of the given construction (examples in Section 4). Using this
new method we check some properties of derived preference relations. The last
section 5 shows how to use the obtained results. Particularly, all derived preference
relations form a complete lattice. In general case, some maximal and minimal
preference relations are described. In all finite cases, this lattice can be effectively
constructed.
In the first section, we give all necessary definitions and some motivations for
the present research.
1 Preliminaries and motivations
A reader can find the necessary algebraic notions and facts in the book Gra¨tzer
(1979), so as some notions and facts concerning binary relations and ordered sets.
But for the convenience of a reader, we recall some fundamental notions of relation
theory.
A binary relation ̺ is a set of ordered pairs, usually it is a subset of the Cartesian
product A×B of two sets, in this case it is called a binary relation between elements
of these sets. The relation ̺−1 = {(b, a)|(a, b) ∈ ̺} is called the inverse relation
to ̺. The well known product of binary relations ̺ and σ is denoted by σ ◦ ̺,
that is σ ◦ ̺ = {(a, c)| (∃b)((a, b) ∈ ̺ & (b, c) ∈ σ)}. A relation ̺ ⊆ A × A is
called reflexive if (∀a ∈ A)(a, a) ∈ ̺, it is called transitive if ̺ ◦ ̺ ⊆ ̺, that is
(a, b) ∈ ̺ and (b, c) ∈ ̺ implies (a, c) ∈ ̺. A transitive and reflexive relation is
called a preorder (or quasiorder) relation, it is called a partial ordering relation if
in addition it is antisymmetric, that is (a1, a2) ∈ ̺
⋂
̺−1 ⇒ a1 = a2. Since we
4
consider in the present paper only partial ordering relations, further we often omit
the word ”partial”.
For notational convenience we denote preorder and order relations by means of
usual signs ≤,≥ with a symbol of the corresponding relation on top. The greatest
element a with respect to a preorder relation ̺ on a set A is defined as usual, that
is for all x ∈ A we have x ≤̺ a. Of course, if it exists it is not unique in general, but
with respect to an order relation it is unique if it exists. An element of an ordered
set is called minimal or an atom if between it and the least element (if it exists)
there are no elements. Dually, a maximal or a dual atom is defined. An ordered set
is called a chain if every two elements of it are comparable (a1 ≤ a2 or a2 ≤ a1).
An ordered set is called a lattice ( complete lattice) if every its two elements have
(every subset has) the least upper bound (supremum) and the greatest lower bound
(infimum).
A map f : A → B from one preorder (A, ̺) to another (B, σ) is called isotonic
if it takes pairs from ̺ to pairs from σ, that is a1 ≤
̺ a2 ⇒ f(a1) ≤
σ f(a2).
If λ is a binary relation then its first projection, pr1λ, is the set of elements a
such that there exists an element b such that (a, b) ∈ λ, its second projection, pr2λ,
is the first projection of the inverse relation λ−1 and its reflexive projection, pr∆λ,
is the set of all elements a such that (a, a) ∈ λ. The equality relation on a set A
we denote by ∆A. Thus pr∆λ = pr1(λ ∩∆A) = pr2(λ ∩∆A) for λ ⊂ A× A.
As for the theory of categories and functors, we can refer a reader to the book
Mac Lane (1971). But we use only basic notions as the most convenient language for
our aim, and it is necessary to know only basic definitions. A category C consists of
two collections, Ob(C), whose elements are the so called objects of C, and Hom(C),
the collection of morphisms (or arrows, homomorphisms, maps) of C. To each
morphism is assigned a pair of objects, called the domain and codomain of the
morphism. The notation f : A→ B means that f is a morphism with the domain
A and the codomain B. If f : A → B and g : B → C are two morphisms, there is
a morphism g ◦ f : A → C called the composite of g and f . For every object A
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there is a morphism idA : A→ A, called the identity of A. These data are subject
to the following axioms:
(1) For f : A→ B, g : B → C, h : C → D ,
h ◦ (g ◦ f) = (h ◦ g) ◦ f ;
(2) For f : A→ B,
f ◦ idA = idB ◦ f = f.
If C and D are categories, a functor F : C → D is a map for which
(1) If f : A → B is a morphism of C, then F (f) : F (A)→ F (B) is a morphism
of D;
(2)F (idA) = idF (A);
(3) If f : A→ B, g : B → C , then F (g ◦ f) = F (g) ◦ F (f).
All other definitions will be given when it will be necessary.
It is known that the maximin principle is the main optimality principle in
the classical decision making theory. Let X be a set of alternatives (strategies) of
a decision maker, call I, Y be a set of medium states and f(x, y) be the payoff
of I if he chooses the strategy x and the medium is situated in the state y. The
alternative x0 is maximin if supx infy f(x, y) = infy f(x0, y), i.e. if it maximizes
the estimate x→ infy f(x, y).
If one considers the triplet G = (X, Y, f) as a two-player zero sum game, it
appears along with the maximin principle for the player 1 the dual one for the
player 2, i.e. theminimax principle: the alternative y0 isminimax if it minimizes
the estimate y → supx f(x, y), i.e. infy supx f(x, y) = supx f(x, y0). The values
v1 = supx infy f(x, y) and v2 = infy supx f(x, y) are called the lower value and the
upper value of the game respectively. By the way, v1 ≤ v2 holds always. If v1 = v2
holds it is said that the game G has a value.
In two-player zero sum game theory, the saddle point principle is the most im-
portant one. We recall that a point (x0, y0) is called a saddle point if f(x, y0) ≤
f(x0, y0) ≤ f(x0, y) for all x ∈ X, y ∈ Y . The existence of a saddle point implies
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the existence of the game value. Conversely, if a game has the value then every
pair (x0, y0), where x0 is a maximin strategy of the player 1 and y0 is a mini-
max strategy of the player 2, forms a saddle point, and every saddle point can be
obtained by this way.
A game with ordered outcomes is a game in which preferences of players are
given by partial ordering relations on the set of outcomes, that is the goal structure
of a such game is a set of outcomes that every player orders according to his own
preferences. In the case of an antagonistic game the goal structure is given by
means of one partial ordering relation that expresses the preferences of the player
1, and the preferences of his opponent (the player 2) are given by the inverse partial
ordering relation.
We consider an antagonistic game as an algebraic structure G = (X, Y,A, ω, F ) ,
where X and Y are the sets of strategies of players 1 and 2, (A, ω) is a ordered
set, F is a map F : X × Y → A that is called a realization function. It is assumed
only that the sets X, Y and A contain more than one element. The fact a1 ≥
ω a2
is interpreted in the sense that the outcome a1 is more preferable for the player 1
than the outcome a2. If the player 1 chooses a strategy x and the player 2 chooses
a strategy y it comes out a situation (x, y) that leads to an outcome F (x, y). So,
the problem arises for every player how to prefer one of his strategy to another.
The most natural point of view is the following one: a strategy x1 is more prefer-
able for the player 1 than a strategy x2 if F (x1, y) ≥
ω F (x2, y) takes place for every
strategy y of the player 2 . It is so called Pareto-domination . The strong Pareto-
domination means that all inequalities in the definition of Pareto-domination are
strong. The maximal according to Pareto-domination strategies are called Pareto-
optimal. But this way has some shortcomings because the problem is reduced to
the problem of choosing one of the Pareto-optimal strategies. Nevertheless it is
obvious that if a strategy x1 Pareto-dominates a strategy x2 it is more preferable
than last one in any other kind of domination.
While searching for other more suitable principals of domination, the notions are
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introduced, that are analogies to the notions of maximin (minimax ) strategy
and the value of a game in the classic case [see Jentzsch (1964), Podinovski (1979)].
The saddle point is defined as usual (see above). Since it can be that an infimum
of a subset of the ordered set (A, ω) does not exist, the following changing is made.
Denote by Vx the set of all outcomes that are ”guaranteed” for the player 1
by the strategy x, that is: Vx = {a ∈ A|(∀y ∈ Y )F (x, y) ≥
ω a}. The estimate
x → infy f(x, y) is replaced by the estimate x → Vx. If the set Vx is assumed as a
characteristic of the strategy x the relation of so called α-dominating for the player
1 arises:
x1 ≤
α x2 ⇔ Vx1 ⊆ Vx2 .
The defined relation α is a preorder relation on the set X of strategies of the player
1. The strategy x0 ∈ X is called an α-greatest one if it is the greatest element
with respect to the preorder relation α. Dually, i.e. by means of rearrangement
of players and replacing ω by ω−1, the definition of an α-greatest strategy of the
player 2 is obtained.
Denote Uy = {a ∈ A |(∃x ∈ X)F (x, y) ≥
ω a} and set:
V =
⋃
x
Vx (the lower characteristic set);
U =
⋂
y
Uy (the upper characteristic set).
The inclusion V ⊆ U holds always. One can regard it as an analogy to the inequality
v1 ≤ v2. The equality V = U is considered in Jentzsch (1964) as an analogy to the
existence of a value of the game G. In this case, we call the coincident lower and
upper characteristic sets the generalized value of the game G.
A game G with payoff function can be considered formally as a game with ordered
outcomes (in this case, the set of outcomes is the set R of real numbers with respect
to usual order, and the function f becomes a payoff function). Then the α-greatest
strategy of the player 1 coincides with his maximin strategy, and the α-greatest
strategy of the player 2 coincides with his minimax strategy, and the equality
V = U implies the equality v1 = v2. Thus the introduced analogies seem to be
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quite natural. But they have some anomalies (some of them were mentioned in
Jentzsch (1964), Podinovski (1981), Rozen (2001)).
Example 1
Consider the gameG = (X, Y,A, ω, F ) with ordered outcomes, where the ordered
set (A, ω) is the following 5-elements lattice: {0 < a, b, c < 1}, and with realization
function F given by the table:
F y1 y2 y3
x1 b c 0
x2 0 a 1 .
Here x1 is the α-greatest strategy of the player 1, y1 is the α-greatest strategy of
the player 2 and V = U . However, the pair (x1, y1) does not form a saddle point,
and this game has no saddle points at all. Besides this, the dual condition V ∗ = U∗
is not satisfied, i. e. the condition of the existence of a generalized value is not
invariant with respect to duality, when the players change places.
Example 2
Consider the antagonistic game G = (X, Y,R2, ω, F ) with vectorial payoffs (i.e
with respect to component-wise ordering), where X = {x1, x2}, Y = {y1, y2} and
the function F is given by the following table:
F y1 y2
x1 (2,1) (1,3)
x2 (4,0) (0,5) .
We see that
Vx1 = {(p, q) ∈ R
2| (p, q) ≤ (2, 1) & (p, q) ≤ (1, 3)} = {(p, q) ∈ R2| (p, q) ≤ (1, 1)};
Vx2 = {(p, q) ∈ R
2| (p, q) ≤ (4, 0) & (p, q) ≤ (0, 5)} = {(p, q) ∈ R2| (p, q) ≤ (0, 0)}.
Hence Vx2 ⊆ Vx1 , that is x1 ≥
α x2 and therefore x1 is the α-greatest strategy.
However, if we ”convolve” the vectorial payoffs according the formula (p, q)→ p+q
we receive the following game:
F y1 y2
x1 3 4
x2 4 5 .
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In this game, x2 is the α-greatest strategy but not x1. The new game is an
homomorphic image of the previous one. Thus for the games with ordered outcomes,
an α-optimal strategy can be changed by passing on to homomorphic images.
Example 3
With the preceding example notation, let the antagonistic game G have the
following function F :
F y1 y2
x1 (2,1) (1,2)
x2 (3,1) (1,3) .
Here the strategy x2 Pareto-dominates the strategy x1 but it holds Vx1 = Vx2 .
Thus it may be that two strategies are equivalent with respect to the α-domination
and one of them strongly Pareto-dominates the other.
Example 4
Consider the gameG = (X, Y,A, ω, F ) with ordered outcomes, where the ordered
set (A, ω) is the following 5-elements lattice: {0 < a, b, c < 1}, and with realization
function F given by the table:
F y1 y2
x1 b 1
x2 c a
x3 1 0 .
Here the strategy x1 is the α-greatest strategy. Extend the set A up to A¯
by adding new elements f, g and h and extend the order on A¯ by setting 0 <
f, g, h; g < a, c; h < b, c. In the obtained game G¯, we have V¯x2 = {0, g}, V¯x1 =
{0, b}, V¯x3 = {0}, hence the strategies x1 and x2 are incomparable with respect to
the α-domination. Thus the condition to be an α-greatest strategy is not preserved
by adding some non-realized outcomes.
On the base of shortcomings mentioned above, we can make a conclusion that
the set of all outcomes that are ”guaranteed” for the player 1 by a strategy is
not a good characteristic of it. There is more fine characteristic based on another
approach. Let (A, ω) be an ordered set. It is possible to extend the relation ω up
to set of all subsets of A by the following two ways:
A1 ≤
ω A2 ⇔ (∀a1 ∈ A1)(∃a2 ∈ A2)a1 ≤
ω a2;
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A1 ≤
ω˜ A2 ⇔ (∀a2 ∈ A2)(∃a1 ∈ A1)a1 ≤
ω a2.
Applying these relations to the set of the kind Ax = {F (x, y)| y ∈ Y } we obtain
notions of so called β − domination and dual β − domination. The explicit forms
of them are the following ones:
x1 ≤
β x2 ⇔ (∀y1 ∈ Y )(∃y2 ∈ Y )F (x1, y2) ≤
ω F (x2, y1);
x1 ≤
β¯ x2 ⇔ (∀y1 ∈ Y )(∃y2 ∈ Y )F (x1, y1) ≤
ω F (x2, y2);
These relations agree with the approach of Berge (1957) to sort out the players
into active and passive ones. An active player wants to have at least one good
outcomes and a passive one does not want to have a bad outcome.
β − domination is interrogated in Rozen (2001), it coincides with relation Rg2
introduced by Podinivski (1979).
2 Preference functor
The main model under consideration is DMP of the following kind
G = (X, Y,A, ω, F ), (1)
where X,Y,A are arbitrary (nonempty) sets, ω ⊆ A×A is a (partial) order relation,
F : X×Y → A is a map. This model is interpreted in the following way. The set X
is a set of alternatives (strategies) of a decision maker, the set Y is a set of states and
A is a set of outcomes (results). The order relation ω expresses the preferences of
the decision maker. And the map F is a realization function (although its values are
not assumed to be real numbers). We assume the following underlying conditions
(axioms) for any derived preference relation ρ ⊆ X2:
(A1) the relation ρ is a preorder relation on X ;
(A2) the relation ρ contains the Pareto-domination relation;
(A3) a ”strengthening” of the relation ω implies a ”strengthening” of the relation
ρ, in other words, by adding new outcomes or new comparable pairs to ω, the
existing preferences of alternatives have to be saved.
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We note that the axioms (A1)-(A3) are from the valuable point of view the minimal
system of natural requirements. The mathematical sense of axioms A1 and A2 is
clear, and an exact form of the axiom A3 will be given below on the base of category
theory.
Fix sets X and Y and consider the category G(X, Y ) which has as objects the
DMPs G = (X, Y,A, ω, F ), and a morphism from G = (X, Y,A, ω, F ) to G1 =
(X, Y,B, δ,H) is a map f : A→ B satisfying the following two conditions:
a1 ≤
ω a2 ⇒ f(a1) ≤
δ f(a2); (2)
f ◦ F = H. (3)
The condition (2) means that f is an isotonic map of the ordered set (A, ω) to the
ordered set (B, δ) and the condition (3) means that f transfers the function F to
the function H. In other words, we consider a DMP (1) as a structure with base
set A, one binary relation ω and a family of 0-ary operations {F (x, y)}(x,y)∈X×Y ,
and the defined morphisms are usual homomorphisms of structures (see Gra¨tzer
(1979)).
Further, a ”strengthening” of preferences on the set of outcomes of the given
DMP G = (X, Y,A, ω, F ) can be formalized as an isotonic map f : A → B of
the ordered set (A, ω) to an ordered set (B, δ), and as a result a new DMP G1 =
(X, Y,B, δ,H) appears, where H = f ◦ F . Thus a ”strengthening” is a morphism
of the category G(X, Y ).
Denote by Q(X) the category which objects are preorder relations on X , and for
ρ ⊆ X×X and σ ⊆ X×X the set Hom(ρ, σ) contains only one morphism if ρ ⊆ σ
and is empty otherwise. Since our aim is to associate with every DMP a preorder
relation ρ ⊆ X×X (a derived preference relation) in such a way that the condition
(A3) is satisfied, we have to consider a map Ψ which assigns to every G(X, Y )-object
G a preorder relation Ψ(G) on X in such way that for every morphism G→ G1 the
inclusion Ψ(G) ⊆ Ψ(G1) is satisfied. Thus we have to construct functors from the
category G(X, Y ) to the category Q(X). This is the mentioned category-theoretical
formalization of the axiom A3.
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Consider the set AY of all maps from Y to A. For every order relation ω on the
set A, we have the order relation ωˆ on AY : (α, β) ∈ ωˆ ⇔ (∀y ∈ Y ) α(y) ≤ω β(y).
As it is known, we can associate with every map F : X × Y → A the map F ∗ :
X → AY , that assigns to every element x ∈ X the map F ∗x : Y → A by the rule:
F ∗x (y) = F (x, y) for all y ∈ Y .
Let P be a map that assigns to every DMP G = (X, Y,A, ω, F ) the relation
F ∗−1(ωˆ) = F ∗−1 ◦ ωˆ ◦ F ∗. We have
P (G) = {(x1, x2)| (∀y ∈ Y )F (x1, y) ≤
ω F (x2, y)}. (4)
It is exactly the Pareto-domination for G. Let f : A→ B be a morphism from G =
(X, Y,A, ω, F ) to G1 = (X, Y,B, δ,H). Then according to definition of morphisms,
we have:
(x1, x2) ∈ P (G)⇒ (∀y ∈ Y )(f ◦ F )(x1, y) ≤
δ (f ◦ F )(x2, y)⇒
⇒ (∀y ∈ Y )H(x1, y) ≤
δ H(x2, y)⇒ (x1, x2) ∈ P (G
1),
that is P is a functor from the category G(X, Y ) to the category Q(X). We call it
the Pareto functor.
Definition 1. A functor Ψ : G(X, Y ) → Q(X) is called a preference functor if
P (G) ⊆ Ψ(G) for every DMP G = (X, Y,A, ω, F ) .
From the point of view of this definition, the conditions (A1)-(A3) mean that
we deal with preference functors from the category G(X, Y ) to the category Q(X).
Our definition of a preference functor is very general. All preference relations that
are considered in the literature indeed satisfy more one condition which seems to be
natural, but we have never seen it in an explicit form. Roughly speaking this condi-
tion means that we choose the same preferences being in similar situations. Consider
two situations (x1, y1) and (x2, y2) that lead to outcomes F (x1, y1) and F (x2, y2)
respectively. We can compare these situations by means of order in A, namely the
second situation is preferable than the first one if F (x1, y1) ≤
ω F (x2, y2). This
13
approach leads to a relation in the set of states for every pair of strategies (x1, x2).
It seems to be naturally to take into account this relation. Below we give the exact
definition.
Definition 2. The state-preference for the pair (x1, x2) with respect to DMP G is
the following relation on the set of states Y :
ρG(x1, x2) = {(y1, y2)| F (x1, y1) ≤
ω F (x2, y2)}. (5)
Definition. A preference functor Ψ : G(X, Y )→ Q(X) is called regular if it satis-
fies the following condition:
(A4)
if ρG(x1, x2) = ρG′(x3, x4) then
(x1, x2) ∈ Ψ(G)⇔ (x3, x4) ∈ Ψ(G
′) (6)
Now we show that so called Ordinal Invariance Axiom (OIA) (see QDT ) is
more stronger that A4. OIA means in our notations that for x1, x2, x3, x4 ∈ X , if
{y ∈ Y | F (x1, y) ≤
ω F (x2, y)} = {y ∈ Y | F (x3, y) ≤
δ F (x4, y)} then (x1, x2) ∈
Ψ(G)⇔ (x3, x4) ∈ Ψ(G
′).
Let ρG(x1, x2) = ρG′(x3, x4). The fact F (x1, y) ≤
ω F (x2, y) means that (y, y) ∈
ρG(x1, x2). The last one is equal to (y, y) ∈ ρG(x3, x4), that is equal for one’s turn to
F (x1, y) ≤
δ F (x2, y). Hence {y ∈ Y | F (x1, y) ≤
ω F (x2, y)} = {y ∈ Y | F (x3, y) ≤
δ
F (x4, y)} and OIA implies that (x1, x2) ∈ Ψ(G) ⇔ (x3, x4) ∈ Ψ(G
′). Thus OIA
implies A4.
3. Main results
In this section, we give a method of constructing of all regular preference functors
Ψ : G(X, Y ) → Q(X) and consider connections between them. It is obvious that
the required construction is not to depend on sets of strategies X and realization
functions F because the last ones only choose and rename some maps from Y to A.
We should mention that some authors consider from the very beginning preorder
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relations on AY , the sets of acts of a decision maker (see for example Barthe´lemy
et al. (1982), Dubois et al. (2002)). But we do not assume in contrast to this point
of view that all mappings are possible acts. However by constructing of preference
functors, we consider preorder relations on the set AY without connections with
functions F . The following fact gives a reason for such approach.
Recall that every map f : A→ B determines a map f˜ : AY → BY under formula:
f˜(ϕ) = f ◦ ϕ for all ϕ : Y → A. Denote by Q the category of all preordered sets
and isotonic maps between them.
Proposition 1.
(1) Let Ψ : G(X, Y ) → Q(X) be a preference functor. Consider a map Ξ that
assigns 1) to every DMP G = (X, Y,A, ω, F ) the preorder relation on the set AY
generated by F ∗ ◦ Ψ(G) ◦ F ∗−1 and ωˆ and 2) to every morphism of DMPs f the
map f˜ . Then Ξ is a functor from the category G(X, Y ) to the category Q.
2) Assume that we have a functor Ξ from the category of all ordered sets to the
category Q which assigns to every ordered set (A, ω) a preorder relation Ξ(ω) on
the set AY and such that the following two conditions are satisfied:
(i) ωˆ ⊆ Ξ(ω) ;
(ii) if f : A → B is an isotonic map of the ordered set (A, ω) into the ordered
set (B, δ) then Ξ(f) = f˜ : AY → BY .
Then the map Ψ which assigns to every DMP G = (X, Y,A, ω, F ) the preorder
relation F ∗−1(Ξ(ω)) determines a preference functor from category G(X, Y ) to the
category Q(X).
Proof. (1) Given a DMP G = (X, Y,A, ω, F ) , consider the kernel of the map F ∗:
εF ∗ = {(x1, x2)| F
∗
x1
= F ∗x2}. We see that εF ∗ is included in the Pareto-domination
relation. Since P (G) ⊆ Ψ(G) and εF ∗ ⊆ P (G), the inclusion εF ∗ ⊆ Ψ(G) holds.
Therefore the preorder relation generated by F ∗ ◦ Ψ(G) ◦ F ∗−1 and ωˆ is equal to
ωˆ ◦F ∗ ◦Ψ(G) ◦F ∗−1 ◦ ωˆ ∪ ωˆ. Now we prove that the map f˜ : aY → BY is isotonic.
In fact, we have f˜ ◦ F ∗ ◦ Ψ(G) ◦ F ∗−1 ◦ f˜−1 = (f ◦ F )∗ ◦ Ψ(G) ◦ (f ◦ F ∗)−1 =
H∗ ◦Ψ(G) ◦H∗−1.
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It is well known (and quite obvious) that if f : A→ A is the identity map then
Ξ(f) = f˜ is also the identity map on AY and that for f : A → B, g : B → C the
equality g˜ ◦ f = g˜ ◦ f˜ . Thus Ξ is a functor.
(2) Let Ξ be a functor satisfying the hypotheses. Let G = (X, Y,A, ω, F ) and
G1 = (X, Y,B, δ,H) and f : G → G1 be a morphism. Since f is an isotonic map,
the map f˜ also is isotonic and therefore (F ∗x1 , F
∗
x2
) ∈ Ξ(ω) ⇒ (f˜(F ∗x1), f˜(F
∗
x2
)) ∈
Ξ(δ). Under formula (3), f˜(F ∗x ) = H
∗
x holds for arbitrary x ∈ X . Therefore the
following implication is true: (F ∗x1 , F
∗
x2
) ∈ Ξ(ω) ⇒ (H∗x1 , H
∗
x2
) ∈ Ξ(δ). Hence
F ∗−1(Ξ(ω)) ⊆ H∗−1(Ξ(δ)). In other words, we can define that Ψ(f) is an inclusion
Ψ(G) ⊆ Ψ(G1) . It is enough for conclusion that Ψ is a functor. The condition (i)
implies that P (G) ⊆ Ψ(G), i.e. the functor Ψ is a preference functor. 
According to Proposition above, we begin to construct functors Ξ from the cate-
gory of ordered sets to the category of preordered sets satisfying the conditions for
a regular preference functor, that is
1) it assigns to every ordered set (A, ω) a preorder relation Ξ(ω) on the set AY
and to every isotonic map f : A→ B the map f˜ : AY → BY ;
2) it includes the Pareto functor: ωˆ ⊆ Ξ(ω) for all ordered sets (A, ω) ;
3) it is regular: if (A, ω) and (B, δ) are ordered sets and ψ−1◦ω◦ϕ = ψ−11 ◦ω◦ϕ1
holds for ϕ, ψ : Y → A and ϕ1, ψ1 : Y → B then (ϕ, ψ) ∈ Ξ(ω)⇔ (ϕ1, ψ1) ∈ Ξ(δ).
We call such a functor also as a regular preference functor.
We recall that a monoid is a nonempty set M together with an associative
binary operation (multiplication) and an element 1 called an identity , such that
m1 = 1m = m for every m ∈ M . The set R(Y ) of all binary relations on Y is a
monoid with respect to composition of binary relations and the identity ∆Y (see
Introduction). We call a subset A of R(Y ) a closed submonoid if it satisfies the
following conditions:
1) α, β ∈ A⇒ β ◦ α ∈ A;
2) ∆Y ∈ A;
3) α ∈ A & α ⊆ β ⇒ β ∈ A.
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Consider an ordered set (A, ω) and choose some closed submonoid A of R(Y ).
Define a relation A(ω) on the set AY setting for arbitrary ϕ1, ϕ2 ∈ A
Y :
(ϕ1, ϕ2) ∈ A(ω)⇔ {(y1, y2) ∈ Y
2| ϕ1(y1) ≤
ω ϕ2(y2)} ∈ A. (7)
It can be expressed also by the formula :
(ϕ1, ϕ2) ∈ A(ω)⇔ ϕ
−1
2 ◦ ω ◦ ϕ1 ∈ A. (8)
It is easy to see that A(ω) is a preorder relation on AY . Indeed, for every
ϕ : Y → A it holds ∆Y ⊆ ϕ
−1 ◦ ω ◦ ϕ , thus we have ϕ−1 ◦ ω ◦ ϕ ∈ A, hence
(ϕ, ϕ) ∈ A(ω). Further, if (ϕ, ψ) ∈ A(ω) and (ψ, γ) ∈ A(ω), then (ϕ, γ) ∈ A(ω),
because γ−1 ◦ ω ◦ ψ ◦ ψ−1 ◦ ω ◦ ϕ ⊆ γ−1 ◦ ω ◦ ϕ.
Theorem 1. Let A be a closed submonoid of R(Y ). The map Ψ that assigns
to every DMP G = (X, Y,A, ω, F ) the preorder relation F ∗−1(A(ω)) determines a
regular preference functor from the category G(X, Y ) to the category Q(X).
Proof.
Let (A, ω) and (B, δ) be ordered sets. Let f : A → B be an isotonic map.
Let further (ϕ, ψ) ∈ A(ω). The last one means that ψ−1 ◦ ω ◦ ϕ ∈ A. Since
ψ−1 ◦ ω ◦ ϕ ⊆ ψ−1 ◦ f−1 ◦ f ◦ ω ◦ f−1 ◦ f ◦ ϕ ⊆ (f ◦ ψ)−1 ◦ δ ◦ (f ◦ ϕ), we have
(f ◦ ϕ, f ◦ ψ) ∈ A(δ).
The fact above can be expressed in the following words: every closed submonoid
A of R(Y ) determines a functor Ξ from the category of ordered sets to the category
Q of preordered sets. This functor assigns to every ordered set (A, ω) the preordered
set (AY ,A(ω)) and to every isotonic map f of (A, ω) in (B, δ) the isotonic map f˜
of (AY ,A(ω)) into (BY ,A(δ)) .
Now we apply the part (2) of Proposition. The condition (ii) is fulfilled. Verify
the condition (i), that is for all ϕ1, ϕ2 ∈ A
Y : (∀y ∈ Y )ϕ1(y) ≤
ω ϕ2(y)⇒ (ϕ1, ϕ2) ∈
A(ω) holds.
Indeed, if (∀y ∈ Y )ϕ1(y) ≤
ω ϕ2(y) then ∆Y ⊆ ϕ
−1
2 ◦ ω ◦ ϕ1 and therefore
ϕ−12 ◦ ω ◦ ϕ1 ∈ A.
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Then the conclusion of Proposition means that the map Ψ which assigns to
every DMP G = (X, Y,A, ω, F ) the preorder relation F ∗−1(A(ω)) and to ev-
ery morphism f : G = (X, Y,A, ω, F ) → G1 = (X, Y,B, δ,H) the inclusion
F ∗−1(A(ω)) ⊆ H∗−1(A(δ)) is a preference functor from the category G(X, Y ) to
the category Q(X).
Further, we have for two DMPs G = (X, Y,A, ω, F ) and G1 = (X, Y,B, δ,H) :
(x1, x2) ∈ Ψ(G)⇔ (F
∗
x1
, F ∗x2) ∈ A(ω),
(x3, x4) ∈ Ψ(G
1)⇔ (H∗x3 , H
∗
x4
) ∈ A(δ).
If ρG(x1, x2) = ρG1(x3, x4), then according to (5) right sides of these formulas are
equivalent and hence (x1, x2) ∈ Ψ(G) ⇔ (x3, x4) ∈ Ψ(G
1), that is (6) is fulfilled.
Thus the functor Ψ is regular. 
Theorem 1 shows that choosing some closed submonoid A of the monoid of all
binary relations on the set Y we can construct derivative preference relations for
every DMP from G(X, Y ). The next theorem shows that this is a way to obtain all
regular preference functors.
Theorem 2.
Let Ξ be a regular preference functor from the category ordered sets to the category
Q. Denote by A the set of all binary relations on the set Y of the form ψ−1 ◦ω ◦ϕ
where (ϕ, ψ) ∈ Ξ(ω). Then A is a closed monoid of relations and A(ω) = Ξ(ω) for
every ordered set (A, ω).
Proof. Consider the trivially ordered set (Y,∆Y ). Since for every ϕ : Y → Y ,
(ϕ, ϕ) ∈ Ξ(∆Y ) holds, we have ϕ
−1 ◦ ∆Y ◦ ϕ ∈ A. For the case ϕ is the identity
map, we obtain that ∆Y ∈ A.
Let ρ, σ ∈ A. Then there are ordered sets (A, ω) and (B, δ) and there are maps
ϕ1, ψ1 : Y → A, ϕ2, ψ2 : Y → B such that (ϕ1, ψ1) ∈ Ξ(ω), (ϕ2, ψ2) ∈ Ξ(δ) and
ρ = ψ−11 ◦ ω ◦ ϕ1, σ = ψ
−1
2 ◦ ω ◦ ϕ2. It can be assumed that sets A and B have
not common elements. Consider the relation τ = ω ∪ δ ∪ δ ◦ϕ2 ◦ψ
−1
1 ◦ω on the set
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A ∪B. It is easy to see that τ is an order relation on this set. For each y ∈ Y we
have
(ψ1(y), ϕ2(y)) ∈ δ ◦ ϕ2 ◦ ψ
−1
1 ◦ ω ⊆ τ.
Consider two inclusions f : A → A ∪ B and g : B → A ∪ B. Under definition
τ , they are isotonic. We conclude from the formula above, that (f ◦ ψ1, g ◦ ϕ2) ∈
Ξ(τ). But since the maps are isotonic, we have also (f ◦ ϕ1, f ◦ ψ1) ∈ Ξ(τ) and
(g ◦ ϕ2, g ◦ ψ2) ∈ Ξ(τ). Therefore (f ◦ ϕ1, g ◦ ψ2) ∈ Ξ(τ). Further we have:
ψ−12 ◦ g
−1 ◦ τ ◦ f ◦ ϕ1 = ψ
−1
2 ◦ δ ◦ ϕ2 ◦ ψ
−1
1 ◦ ω ◦ ϕ1 = σ ◦ ρ
and hence σ ◦ ρ ∈ A. Thus we have proved that A is a monoid.
Now we have to proof that this monoid is a closed submonoid of R(Y ). Firstly
observe a trivial fact that every relation σ ⊆ Y ×Y can be represented in the form:
σ = ψ−1 ◦ω ◦ϕ for some ordered set (A, ω) and maps ϕ, ψ : Y → A. Indeed, let Y1
and Y2 be two copies of Y without common elements. Let ϕ : Y → Y1 and ψ : Y →
Y2 be the corresponding identification maps. Define ω = ∆Y1 ∪∆Y2 ∪ ψ ◦ σ ◦ ϕ
−1.
It is true that ω is an order relation on A = Y1 ∪ Y2 because a pair of different
elements belongs to ω only if the first of them belongs to Y1 and the second one
belongs to Y2. It is easy to see that σ = ψ
−1 ◦ ω ◦ ϕ.
Let ρ ⊆ σ and ρ ∈ A. The last one means that there exist ϕ1, ψ1 : Y → B
and order relation δ in B such that ρ = ψ−11 ◦ δ ◦ ϕ1 and (ϕ1, ψ1) ∈ Ξ(δ). As it
was mentioned above, σ = ψ−1 ◦ ω ◦ ϕ for some maps ϕ, ψ : Y → B and order
relation ω in B. Consider the ordered set (A×B, ω× δ) where ((a1, b1), (a2, b2)) ∈
ω × δ ⇔ (a1, a2) ∈ ω & (b1, b2) ∈ δ. We have two natural maps α, β : Y →
A ×B where α(y) = (ϕ(y), ϕ1(y)) and β(y) = (ψ(y), ψ1(y)). It is easy to see that
β−1 ◦ (ω × δ) ◦ α = ρ. Since the functor Ξ is regular, the last equality means that
(α, β) ∈ Ξ(ω × δ). Using the isotonic map π : A × B → A, projection on A, we
obtain that (ϕ, ψ) ∈ Ξ(ω), and hence σ ∈ A. Therefore the monoid A is closed.
Now let (ϕ, ψ) ∈ A(ω) for some ordered set (A, ω). It is equivalent according to
(8) that ρ = ψ−1 ◦ ω ◦ ϕ ∈ A. The last fact means that there exist ϕ1, ψ1 : Y → B
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and order relation δ in B such that ρ = ψ−11 ◦ δ ◦ϕ1 and (ϕ1, ψ1) ∈ Ξ(δ). Since the
functor Ξ is regular, it is equivalent to (ϕ, ψ) ∈ Ξ(ω). Therefore A(ω) = Ξ(ω). 
3. Examples and applications.
Thus to observe all closed preference functors from the category G(X, Y ), we have
to observe all closed monoids of relations on the set Y . In reality, it is sufficient
to choose a submonoid of R(Y ) and then consider all relations which include its
members. All closed submonoids of A form a lattice with respect to inclusion. This
lattice is complete. The least element of this lattice is submonoid of all reflexive
relations and the greatest one is R(Y ) itself. We show below that the submonoid of
all reflexive relations gives the Pareto-domination. Clearly, R(Y ) gives the greatest
preference relation, i. e. the complete relation on X : X × X . If A is a closed
submonoid of R(Y ), then the set of all relations ̺−1 for ̺ ∈ A also is a submonoid
of R(Y ). Thus to every preference functor, there is the dual one. If they coincide,
we have a self-dual preference functor. Below we give some useful examples.
Examples
1. Consider the set of all reflexive relations on the set Y . Clearly, it is a sub-
monoid of R. Let A be this submonoid. The corresponding derivative preference
relation is the Pareto-domination. Indeed,
(α, β) ∈ A(ω)⇔ ∆Y ⊆ β
−1 ◦ ω ◦ α⇔ (∀y ∈ Y )α(y) ≤ω β(y)⇔ (α, β) ∈ ωˆ. (9)
2. We call a relation on Y surjective if its second projection is equal to Y. Clearly,
all such relations form a submonoid of R. Let A be the submonoid of all surjective
relations. The corresponding derivative preference relation is the β-domination
defined in Section 1. Indeed,
(α, β) ∈ A(ω)⇔ pr2(β
−1 ◦ ω ◦ α) = Y ⇔ (∀y ∈ Y )(∃y′ ∈ Y ) α(y′) ≤ω β(y). (10)
Thus
(x1, x2) ∈ F
∗−1(A(ω))⇔ (∀y)(∃y′)F (x1, y
′) ≤ω F (x2, y). (11)
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3. Dually to the previous example, let A be the submonoid of all everywhere
defined relations (it means the first projection of a relation is equal to Y). The
corresponding derivative preference relation is the dual β-domination. The proof is
the same that above.
4. Recall that a filter on the set Y is a set F of non-empty subsets of Y satisfying
the following conditions: 1)Y ∈ F, 2) A,B ∈ F implies A ∩ B ∈ F and 3) A ∈ F
and A ⊆ B implies B ∈ F.
Let F be a filter on the set Y . Define A = {λ ⊆ Y × Y | pr∆ ∈ F}. The
corresponding derivative preference relation is the preference according to the filter.
It can be expressed as follows: a strategy x2 is more preferable than a strategy x1
if the set of all y for which F (x1, y) ≤
ω F (x2, y) belongs to the filter F. The well
known interpretation: ”the majority vote for”.
A filter F is called principal if it is of the following form: F = {P ⊆ Y | P0 ⊆ P ,
where P0 is a fixed subset of Y . One can consider the set P0 as a system of
dominators. If particularly P0 consists of one state only, this state can be considered
as a indicator (or a dictator): a strategy x1 is preferable than x2 if and only if the
strategy x1 gives for this state the result better than x2. If the set Y is finite, every
filter is principal.
5. Let σ be an idempotent relation on the set Y , that is σ ◦ σ = σ. It means
that a decision maker has some special preferences on the set of states. Denote by
A the closed monoid generated by σ. It consists of reflexive binary relations and
all binary relations containing σ. We have
(α, β) ∈ A(ω)⇔ (α, β) ∈ ωˆ ∨ (∀y1, y2 ∈ Y )((y1, y2) ∈ σ ⇒ α(y1) ≤
ω β(y2)). (12)
According to this we obtain a new derived preference relation.
We recall that Example 3 given in Section 1 presents two strategies equivalent
with respect to α-domination such that one of them strongly Pareto-dominates the
other. Although α-domination can not be realized by means of a preference functor,
such undesirable event can appear, for example if one chooses the greatest monoid
A.
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Definition 3. Let G be a DMP. Let P (G)str denote the strong Pareto-domination
for G. A preference functor Ψ : G(X, Y )→ Q(X) is called suitable for the G if the
following condition is satisfied:
(A5)
Ψ(G) ∩ P (G)−1str = ∅.
The condition above means that it is impossible that two strategies x1 and
x2 are equivalent with respect to preference relation Ψ(G) but x2 strong Pareto-
dominates x1 . It is obvious that Pareto preference functor is suitable for all DMPs.
In general case a preference functor can be suitable for some DMPs and non-suitable
for another ones.
Proposition 2. Let A be a closed submonoid of R(Y ). If every relation ρ ∈ A has
a fixed point y, i. e. (y, y) ∈ ρ, then the preference functor Ψ determined by A is
suitable for every DMP.
Proof. Let G = (X, Y,A, ω, F ) be a DMP. Suppose that (α, β) ∈ A(ω). It means
that β−1 ◦ ω ◦ α ∈ A. Under hypotheses, this relation has a fixed point y0. For
this point α(y0) ≦
ω β(y0) holds. Hence it is impossible that (∀y)β(y) <
ω α(y). It
means that Ψ(G) ∩ P (G)−1str = ∅. 
Corollary 1. The preference functor according to a filter on the set Y (example
4) is suitable for every DMP .
Proposition 3. Let A be a non-universal closed submonoid of R(Y ). If A(ω) ∩
ω−1str 6= ∅, then (A, ω) contains a chain a1 < a2 < ... < ak for every positive integer
k.
Proof. Suppose that there are ϕ, ψ ∈ AY such that (ϕ, ψ) ∈ A(ω) but ψ(y) <ω ϕ(y)
for all y ∈ Y . Then the relation ρ = {(y1, y2)| ϕ(y1) ≦
ω ψ(y2)} = ψ
−1 ◦ ω ◦ ϕ
belongs to A. Hence ρk ∈ A for arbitrary natural number k. Since ϕ ◦ ψ−1 ⊆ ωstr,
ρ2 = ψ−1 ◦ω ◦ϕ ◦ψ−1 ◦ω ◦ϕ ⊆ ψ−1 ◦ωstr ◦ϕ, and further ρ
3 ⊆ ψ−1 ◦ω2str ◦ϕ, and
so long, ..., ρk ⊆ ψ−1 ◦ ωk−1str ◦ ϕ. Since submonoid A is closed ψ
−1 ◦ ωkstr ◦ ϕ ∈ A
for all k. Under hypotheses, A is not universal and therefore all these relations
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are not empty. It gives a sequence a1, ..., ak for every integer k > 0 such that
a1 < a2 < ... < ak . 
Corollary 2. If lengths of all strong chains in the set of outcomes of a DMP G
are bounded above, then every non trivial derivative preference relation is suitable
for G, particularly for all DMPs with finite set of outcomes.
Proposition 3 generalizes the following result obtained in [Rozen (2001), Theorem
2].
Corollary 3. If the ordered set of outcomes for a DMP G satisfies descending
(increasing) chain condition then β-domination (inverse β-domination) preference
functor is suitable for G.
Proof. The submonoid A corresponding to β-domination preference functor consists
of all surjective relations. Suppose that A(ω) ∩ ω−1str 6= ∅. Then with the notation
of the proof of Proposition 3, the relation ψ−1 ◦ ωkstr ◦ ϕ is surjective. It means
that for every y ∈ Y there is y1 ∈ Y such that (ϕ(y1), ϕ(y)) ∈ ω
k
str. It leads
to an infinite descending chain in A. This contradiction shows that β-domination
preference functor is suitable for G.
5. Conclusion
The approach suggested in the paper and based on category theory leads to a
strong definition of derived preferences of a decision maker and the obtained results
give a method to observe all such preferences and compare them with each other.
The most important point is that we start from minimal conditions and therefore
include all reasonable other approaches but exclude all anomalies mentioned in
Section 2. The second point is that we reduce the problem formulated in Introduc-
tion to pure algebraical one, namely to study closed monoids of binary relations.
Indeed, using Theorems 1 and 2 it is possible to build (of course, if the set Y of
states is finite) all regular preference functors for given set X of strategies. One
must mention that these theorems establish connections between regular functors
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(from the category of all ordered sets to the category of preordered sets) and closed
monoids and are new.
It was said that all closed monoids of relations on the set Y form a lattice. This
lattice is a complete lattice. If a monoid A1 is a submonoid of a monoid A2 and ξ1
and ξ2 are the corresponding derived preferences relations on the set X for a DMP
G, then we have ξ1 ⊆ ξ2. It can be interpreted that preference ξ2 is stronger than
ξ1: if x2 is preferable than x1 in the sense of ξ1 it is preferable than x1 in the sense
of ξ2.
In the simple cases, when the set Y is not too large, one can describe explicitly all
derivative preference relations. For example, when the set Y has only two elements
there are only 16 binary relations on Y , the derivative preference relations are: two
extremal relations (the universal one and the Pareto-domination), two relations
associated with two principal filters, the β-domination, the inverse β-domination
(four maximal relations only) and their intersections. In the case when Y contains
more elements it is more complicated computational problem, but is seems that the
most important thing is to give a qualitative description which does not depend on
a set of states.
The Pareto-domination is the weakest derivative preference relation. The uni-
versal (all strategies are equivalent) relation is the strongest derivative preference
relation. It is very easy to proof that the monoid of all surjective relations and the
monoid of all everywhere defined relations are maximal closed submonoids (dual
atoms). It means that β-domination and inverse β-domination are maximal prefer-
ences, i.e. there are no preference relations between each of them and the universal
relation.
It may be that a decision maker has some preferences also in the set Y . One
can take such preferences in consideration choosing a filter on the set Y or some
idempotent relation on it. This leads to the derived preference relations described
in the examples 4 and 5 in the Section 4. The preference relations associated with
principal filters (the case of dictators) are also maximal ones.
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Taking intersections of these known monoids we obtain new preference relations
that are weaker than their parents. For example, considering the intersection of
β- and inverse β-domination (i. e. the monoid of all everywhere defined surjective
relations) gives a new preference relation that can be expressed by the formula: x2
is preferable than x1 iff
(∀y1)(∃y2)F (x1, y1) ≤ F (x2, y2) ∧ (∀y2)(∃y1)F (x1, y1) ≤ F (x2, y2). (13)
On the other hand one can consider minimal preference relations (atoms). Let
y0 ∈ Y be a fixed element. Build the relation ̺ = Y ×Y \{(y0, y0)}. It is a maximal
relation and ̺ ◦ ̺ = Y ×Y . Thus all reflexive relations and ̺ form a closed monoid
that clearly is a minimal element in the lattice of all closed monoids. This is a way
to build all minimal derived preference relations. The sense of them is obvious: x2
is preferable than x1 iff x2 Pareto-dominates x1 or F (x1, y1) ≤ F (x2, y2) for all
pairs of states (y1, y2) different from (y0, y0) . It means that if a decision maker
wants to ignore for some reason the correlation between F (x1, y0) and F (x2, y0)
he has to check the inequality above for all pairs of states, with the exception of
(y0, y0).
We see that there are many different preference functors. But it is not a short-
coming, it is the nature of things. Practically, we choose one of these functors
following supplementary data. For example, one can consider some structures on
the set of states like mentioned above or a probability distribution and use corre-
sponding preference functors.
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